Abstract. PRO (Pseudorandom Oracle) is an important security of hash functions because it ensures that the hash function inherits all properties of a random oracle up to the PRO bound (e.g., security against length extension attack, collision resistant security, preimage resistant security and so on). In this paper, we propose new blockcipher-based double-length hash functions, which are PROs up to O(2 n ) query complexity in the ideal cipher model. Our hash functions use a single blockcipher, which encrypts an n-bit string using a 2n-bit key, and maps an input of arbitrary length to an n-bit output. Since many blockciphers supports a 2n-bit key (e.g. AES supports a 256-bit key), the assumption to use the 2n-bit key length blockcipher is acceptable. To our knowledge, this is the first time double-length hash functions based on a single (practical size) blockcipher with birthday PRO security.
Introduction
The blockcipher-based design (e.g. [21, 28] ) is the most popular method for constructing a cryptographic hash function. A hash function is designed by the following two steps: (1) designing a blockcipher and (2) designing a mode of operation. MD-family [29, 30] , SHA-family [25] and SHA-3 candidates follow the design method. Another design method is to utilize a practical blockcipher such as AES. Such hash functions are useful in size restricted devices such as RFID tags and smart cards: when implementing both a hash function and a blockcipher, one has only to implement a blockcipher. However, the output length of practical blockciphers is far too short for a collision resistant hash function, e.g., 128 bits for AES. Thus the design of collision resistant double length hash functions (CR-DLHFs) is an interesting topic. The core of the design of CRDLHFs is to design a collision resistant double-length compression functions (CR-DLCFs) which maps an input of fixed length (more than 2n-bits) to an output of 2n-bit length when using an n-bit output length blockcipher. Then a hash function combined a domain extension (e.g. strengthened Merkle-Damgård (SMD) [6, 23] ), which preserves CR security, with a CR-DLCF yield a CR-DLHF. Many DLCFs, e,g,. [2, 24, 13, 16, 26, 18, 20] , have been designed and the security is proven in the ideal cipher (IC) model [9, 13, 19, 11, 26, 17, 31] .
The indifferentiability framework was introduced by Maurer et al. [22] , which considers the reducibility of one system to another system. Roughly speaking, if a system F is indifferentiable from another system G up touery complexity, we can use F instead of G up touery complexity. So any cryptosystem is at least as secure under F as under G up touery complexity. Recent proposed hash functions, e.g. SHA-3 candidates, considered the security of the indifferentiability from a random oracle (RO) (or Pseudorandom Oracle (PRO)). It ensures that the hash function has no structural design flows in composition and has security against any generic attacks up to the PRO query complexity (e.g., length extension attack, collision attack, preimage attack and so on). So it is important to consider PRO security when a DLHF is designed.
Hereafter a blockcipher which encrypts an n-bit string using a k-bit key is denoted by (k,n)-BC. Gong et al. [12] proved that the prefix-free Merkle-Damgård using the PBGV compression function [27] is PRO up to O(2 n/2 ) query complexity as long as the (2n,n)-BC is IC. The PRO security is not enough because the query complexity is O (2 64 ) when n = 128. Chang et al. [4] and Hirose et al. [14] proposed 2n-bit output length DLHFs using a compression function h : {0, 1}
d → {0, 1} n where d > 2n. Their proposals are PROs up to O(2 n ) query complexity as long as h is a fixed input length RO (FILRO). Since IC where the plain text element is fixed by a constant is FILRO, these hash functions can be modified to blockcipher-based schemes which use a (d,n)-BC. However, practical blockciphers (such as AES) don't support d-bit key where d > 2n. Many other practical size 1 blockcipher-based DLHFs were proposed, e.g., [2, 24, 13, 16, 26, 18, 20] , while none of them achieves PRO security. 2 There is no hash function with birthday PRO security, and thus, we rise the following question:
Can we construct a DLHF from a "single practical size blockcipher" with "birthday PRO security"?
In this paper, we propose DLHFs using a single (2n,n)-BC, which are PROs up to O(2 n ) query complexity in the IC model. Since many blockciphers support 2n-bit key length, e.g., AES supports 256-bit key length, and the existing DLCFs (e.g. Hirose's compression function [13] , Tandem-DM [16] , Abreast-DM [16] , and generalized DLCF [26] ) use a (2n,n)-BC, the assumption to use a (2n,n)-BC is acceptable. To our knowledge, our hash functions are the first time DLHFs based on a practical size blockcipher with birthday PRO security. When n = 128 which is supported by AES, our hash functions have O (2 128 ) security. Since our hash functions use only a single blockcipher, it is useful on size restricted devices when implementing both a hash function and a blockcipher. (the hybrid encryption schemes use both a blockcipher and a hash function (used in a key derivation function), for example.)
Our DLHF. Our DLHFs, which use Hirose's compression function [13] , Tandem-DM [16] or Abreast-DM [16] , iterate the compression function and use a new post-processing function f at the last iteration which calls a (2n, n)-BC twice. Our DLHFs are slightly lesser for speed than existing CR-DLHFs but have higher security (birthday PRO security).
Let BC 2n,n = (E, D) be a (2n,n)-BC where E is an encryption function and D is a decryption function. Let DLCF BC2n,n be a DLCF: Hirose's compression function, Tandem-DM, or Abreast-DM. Let SMD
{0, 1} * → {0, 1} 2n be the SMD hash function using the compression function DLCF BC2n,n . Our DLHF is defined as follows:
where f BC2n,n (x) = E(x, c 1 )||E(x, c 2 ) and c 1 and c 2 are n-bit constant values. Note that the first element of the encryption function is the key element and the second element is the plain text element. The DLHF using Hirose's compression function is illustrated in Fig. 1 where each line is n bits and IV [0], IV [1] , C, c 1 and c 2 are constant values. Note that in this figure we omit the suffix free padding function sfpad. So the hash function takes as its input a message M , sfpad(M ) = M 1 ||M 2 || · · · ||M l with each block of n bits, and outputs the final value rv 1 ||rv 2 . We use the DLHF SMD DLCF BC 2n,n to compress an arbitrary length input into an fixed input length value. Since SMD hash functions cannot be used as ROs [5] , the post-processing function f BC2n,n is used to guarantee PRO security. The use of the constant values c 1 and c 2 in the post-processing function is inspired by the design technique of EMD proposed by Bellare and Ristenpart [1] . This realizes the fact that the post-processing function behaves like RO. So we can treat our hash function as a NMAC-like hash function. Note that the security of EMD is proven when the compression function is FILRO, while the security of our hash functions is proven when the compression function is the DLCF in the IC model. So additional analyses are needed due to the invertible property of IC and the structures of DLCFs. 3 We thus prove the PRO security of F BC2n,n by using 2 Since PRO security is stronger security than CR security. CR security does not guarantee PRO security. 3 One may think that there is an attack based on a decryption (inversion) function of the blockcipher. But our hash functions avoid the attack from the PRO security proof. For confirmation, we consider the attack in Appendix A.
three techniques: the PrA (Preimage Aware) design framework of Dodis et al. [7] , PRO for a small function [5] , and indifferentiability from a hash function. The first two techniques are existing techniques and the last technique is a new application of the indifferentiability framework [22] . First, we prove that the DLCFs are PrA up to O(2 n ) query complexity. The PrA design framework offers the hash functions which are PROs up to O(2 n ) query complexity where FILRO is used as the post-processing function. Second, we convert FILRO into the blockcipher-based post-processing function. We prove that the post-processing function is PRO up to O(2 n ) query complexity in the IC model (PRO for a small function). Then, we prove that the PRO security of the post-processing function and the first PRO result ensure that the converted hash functions are PROs up to O(2 n ) query complexity. Note that the hash functions use two blockciphers. 4 Finally, we consider the single-blockcipher-based hash functions F BC2n,n . We prove that the single blockcipher-based hash functions are indifferentiable from the two-blockciphers-based hash functions in the IC model up to O(2 n ) query complexity (indifferentiability from a hash function). Then we show that the indifferentiable security result and the second PRO result ensure that our hash functions are PROs up to O(2 n ) query complexity in the IC model.
Preliminaris
Notation. For two values x, y, x||y is the concatenated value of x and y. For some value y, x ← y means assigning y to x. ⊕ is bitwise exclusive or. |x| is the bit length of x. For a set (list) T and an element W , T ← W means to insert W into T and
is the first n bit value and x [1] is the last n-bit value.
n is a decryption function, the key size is d bits and the cipher text size is n bits. 
We denote MD h , when padding pad is a suffix-free padding sfpad, by SMD h , called strengthened MerkleDamgård. We assume that it is easy to strip padding, namely that there exists an efficiently computable function unpad :
Inputs to unpad that are not valid outputs of pad are mapped to ⊥ by unpad.
Pseudorandom Oracle [22] . Let H P : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n be a hash function that utilizes an ideal primitive P . We say that H P is PRO if there exists an efficient simulator S that simulates P such that for any distinguisher A outputting a bit it is the case that
is small where the probabilities are taken over the coins used the experiments. S can make queries to F n . The S's task is to simulate P such that relations among responses of (H P , P ) hold in responses of (F n , S) as well.
Preimage Awareness [7, 8] . The notion of preimage awareness is useful for PRO security proofs of NMAC hash functions. We only explain the definition of preimage awareness. Please see Section 3 of [8] for the spirit of the notion. Let F P be a hash function using an ideal primitive P . The preimage awareness of F P is estimated by the following experiment.
Here an adversary A is provided two oracles P and Ex. The oracle P provides access to the ideal primitive P and records a query histry α. The extraction oracle Ex provides an interface to an extractor E, which is a deterministic algorithm that uses z and the query history α of P , and returns either ⊥ or an element x such that F P (x ) = z. If x can be constructed from α, it returns x and otherwise returns ⊥. In this experiment, the (initially everywhere ⊥) array Q and the (initially empty) array V are used. When z is queried to Ex, Q[z] ← 1 and then the output of E(z, α) is assigned to V [z] . For the hash function F P , the adversary A, and the extractor E, we define the advantage relation
where the probabilities are over the coins used in running the experiments. When there exists an efficient extractor E such that for any adversary A the above advantage is small, we say that F P is preimage aware (PrA).
The pra-advantage can be evaluated from the cr-advantage (collision resistance advantage) and the 1-wpra (1-weak PrA) advantage [8] . The 1-WPrA experiment is described as follows.
The difference between the 1-WPrA experiment and the PrA experiment is the extraction oracle. In the 1-WPrA experiment, a multi-point extractor oracle Ex + is used. Ex + provides an interface to a multi-point extractor E + , which is a deterministic algorithm that uses z and α, and returns either ⊥ or a set of an element in the domain of
In this experiment, an adversary A can make only a single query to Ex + . For a hash function F P , an adversary A, and a multi-point extractor E + , we define the advantage relation
where the probabilities are over the coins used in running the experiments. When there exists an efficient multi-point extractor E + such that the above advantage is small for any adversary A, we say that
The definition of the cr-advantage as follows. Let A be an adversary that outputs a pair of values x and x . To hash function F P using primitive P and adversary A we associate the advantage relation
where the probability is over the coins used by A and primitive P . Then the pra-advantage can be evaluated as follows.
Lemma 1 (Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 of [8])
. Let E + be an arbitrary multi-point extractor. There exists an extractor E such that for any pra-advarsary A pra making q e extraction queries and q P primitive queries there exists 1-wpra adversary A 1wpra and cr-adversary A cr such that 2n → {0, 1} 2n be a function. In this section, we propose the following DLHFs using a single blockcipher and prove that our hash functions are PROs up to O(2 n ) query complexity in the IC model.
Blockcipher-Based Double-Length Hash Functions for PROs
where f BC2n,n (x) = E(x, c 1 )||E(x, c 2 ) such that c 1 and c 2 are n-bit different constant values and are different from values which are defined by the compression function (see subsection 3.3). The hash functions use Hirose's compression function, Tandem-DM, and Abreast-DM as the underlying DLCF, respectively. We prove the PRO security by the three steps. Each step uses the PrA design framework, PRO for a small function and indifferentiability from a hash function, respectively.
-Step 1. We prove that Hirose's compression function, Tandem-DM, and Abreast-DM are PrA up to O(2 n ) query complexity in the IC model. Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 then ensure that the following NMAC hash function is PRO up to O(2 n ) query complexity as long as the blockcipher is IC and g is FILRO.
,n is PRO up to O(2 n ) query complexity in the IC model where c 1 and c 2 are n-bit different values. Then, we prove that the PRO security of F 1 and the PRO security of f ensure that the following hash function is PRO up to O(2 n ) query complexity in the IC model, namely, it can be used as RO up to O(2 n ) query complexity in the IC model. 
Step 1
We prove that Hirose's compression function [13] is PrA up to O(2 n ) query complexity as long as the blockcipher is an ideal cipher. Similarly, we can prove that Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM [16] are PrA. These proofs are given in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively.
Definition 1 (Hirose's Compression Function
is calculated as follows:
We call the procedure 1 "first block" and the procedure 2 "second block".
Lemma 4 (Hirose's Compression Function is PrA
There exists an extractor E such that for any adversary A making at most q P queries to C 2n,n and q e extraction queries we have
where E runs in time at most O(q e q P ).
Proof. We prove that Hirose's compression function is 1-WPrA, and then Lemma 1 gives the final bound. We note that Theorem 3 of [11] upperbounds the cr-advantage of A by 2q
, yielding the first two terms.
Intuitively, the 1-WPrA game for the compression function is that A declares a value z then an extractor outputs preimages, stored in L, of z which can be constructed from input-output values of A's queries to C 1 2n,n . Then A outputs a new preimage of z which is not stored in L. Note that A can adaptively query to C 1 2n,n . We define the multi-point extractor to utilize the preimage resistant bound, proven in [11] , of Hirose's compression function in Fig. 2 . If an input-output triple of the first block is defined, automatically the input of the second block is defined, and vice versa, from the definition of the compression function. For a query (z, α) to E + , when there is an input-output triple (k, x, y) such that x ⊕ y = z[0], the multi-point extractor E + checks whether the output of the second block is equal to z [1] or not and if this holds the multi-point extractor stores it in the return list L, and vice versa. Therefore, A must find a new preimage of z to win the 1-WPrA experiment. Thus one can straightforwardly adapt the preimage resistant advantage of the compression function (described in Theorem 5 of [11] ) 6 because the proof of Theorem 5 of [11] can be applied to the case that an adversary selects an image z of the compression function and then finds the preimage of z. The advantage is at most 2q P /(2 n − q P ) 2 .
Lemma 4 ensures the following theorem via Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 where
and S1 g makes q g queries to F 2n where Q 1 = 2l(q H + 1) + q E + q D . S1 g simulates g, which makes one query to F 2n for one S1 g query, and S1 C , which makes no query, simulates the ideal cipher.
Step 2 Lemma 5 (f
and makes at most queries q E + q D . S simulates the ideal cipher.
Proof. We define S = (S E , S D ) such that it simulates C 3 2n,n = (E3 I , D3 I ) and the relation among responses of (f C 3 2n,n , E3 I , D3 I ) holds in responses of (g, S E , S D ) as well. Since the relation f
S has (initially everywhere ⊥) arrays E, D and (initially empty) tables
We give the proof via a game-playing argument on the game sequences Game 0, Game 1, Game 2. Game 0 is the f C 3 2n,n scenario and Game 2 is the g scenario. In each game, A 2 can make queries to three oracles (O f , O E , O D ) . Let Gj be the event that in Game j the distinguisher A 2 outputs 1. Therefore,
,n , E3 I , D3 I ).
Game 1:
We change the underlying ideal cipher from C 3 2n,n to S.
. Note that only S has oracle access to g. We must show that the A 2 's view has statistically close distribution in Game 0 and Game 1. Since the difference between the games is the underlying function, we show that the output of the functions is statistically close; this in turn shows that the A 2 's view has statistically close distribution in Game 0 and Game 1.
In the following, we use the following lazily-sample method of the ideal cipher.
Encryption Oracle
E and D are (initially everywhere ⊥) arrays and T E and T D (initially empty) tables. For any (k,
On a query which the key element is k, first the output of E I (k, c 1 ) is determined (Steps 03-04 or Steps [13] [14] and second the output of E I (k, c 2 ) is determined (Steps 05-06 or Steps 15-16). Then the outputs of E I (k, x) such that x = c 1 and x = c 2 are determined. Since no adversary (distinguisher) learns E I (k, c 1 ) and E I (k, c 2 ) until querying the corresponding value, the procedures of Steps 03-06 and 13-16 do not affect the lazily-sample ideal cipher simulation.
We consider the difference of the ideal cipher and S. On a query in which the key element is k, the output of S E (c 2 , k) is randomly chosen from {0, 1} n because g is RO while the output of
Thus the statistical distance between the uniform distribution in {0, 1} n and the uniform distribution in {0, 1}
n \{E[k, c 1 ]} is 1/2 n . Since the number of queries to S is at most q f +q E +q D times,
Game 2:
and this is the g scenario. We show that the A 2 's view in Game G1 and Game G2 is equivalent. O f is different in both games. To prove the equivalence, we use the proof method in [5, 15] 
Proof of Point 2. In Game 1, O f uses O E , namely, if the outputs of S E (k, c 1 ) and
. So we must show that the same holds in Game 2. Since From above discussions, we have that
Using Theorem 1 and Lemma 5, we show that F 2 using Hirose's compression function is PRO up to O(2 n ) query complexity in the IC model. Similarly, we can prove the hash functions using Tandem-DM and Abreast-DM. Proof. We use Theorem 1 and Lemma 5. We define the simulator S 2 = (S2, S3) by S2 = S1 C and S3 = S S1g where (S1 g , S1 C ) are defined in Theorem 1 and S is defined in Lemma 5. Namely,
Theorem 2 (F 2 is PRO). There exists a simulator
where on a query to S3 E , S E accepts the query, calculates the output value by using S1 g and returns it, and similarly S3 D is defined. In the following, we evaluate the PRO bound of
. We assume that A 2 is a distinguisher such that the PRO bound of f is maximum. For any distinguisher A 3 ,
2n,n 1 ,S1
(A 1 ). Thus, when using the bounds of Theorem 1 and Lemma 5, the PRO bound of F 2 can be obtained where A 2 can make at most (q H , q E3 , q D3 ) queries to its three oracles (see Lemma 5) and A 1 can make at most (q H , q 3 , q E2 , q D2 ) queries to its four oracles (see Theorem 1).
The second equation holds because

Step 3
In the following proof, we consider the hash function using Hirose's compression function. Using the same proof, we can prove the cases of Tandem-DM and Abreast-DM. So we omit these proofs. When using Hirose First, we define the indifferentiability from a hash function as follows. 
Definition 2. Let H
Adv indif H P 1 1 ,H P 2 2 ,S (A 4 ) ≤ | Pr[A H P 1 1 ,P1 4 ⇒ 1] − Pr[A H P 2 2 ,S P 2 4 ⇒ 1]|
is small where the probabilities are taken over the coins used the experiments.
The following lemma is that F is indifferentiable from F 2 up to O(2 n ) query complexity in the IC model. 
Fig. 3. Simulator
Proof. Without loss of generality, we omit the padding function of our hash function which is more general case than including the padding function. In Fig. 3 , we define a simulator S = (S E , S D ) such that it simulates the ideal cipher C 2n,n = (E I , D I ) and the relation among responses of (F C2n,n , E I , D I ) holds in responses of
Since E2 I is used in inner calculations and E3 I is used in the post-processing calculations, if for a query (k, x) to S E (k, x) is used in the post-processing calculations, it returns the output of E3 I (k, x), and otherwise it returns the output of E2 I (k, x). Since in post-processing calculation the second value x of a E query is c 1 or c 2 , we define S such that S E (k, x) is defined by E3 I (k, x), if x = c 1 or x = c 2 , and is defined by E2 I (k, x) otherwise.
7 E and D are (initially everywhere ⊥) arrays.
We give the proof via a game-playing argument on the game sequences Game 0, Game 1, and Game 2. Game 0 is the F scenario and Game 2 is the F 2 scenario. In each game, A 4 can make queries to three
Let Gj be the event that in Game j the distinguisher A 4 outputs 1. Therefore,
Game 1: We modify the underlying functions (O
where only S has oracle access to (C 2 2n,n , C 3 2n,n ). We must show that the A 4 's view has statistically close distribution in Game 0 and Game 1. Since the difference between the games is the underlying function, we show that the output of the functions is statistically close; this in turn shows that the A 4 's view has statistically close distribution in Game 0 and Game 1. First we rewrite S in Fig. 4 . C 3 2n,n is hard-coded in the steps e03-e05, e06-e08, d03-05 and d06-08 where E2 and D2 are (initially everywhere ⊥) arrays to store the output of the ideal cipher and T E2 and T D2 are (initially everywhere empty) tables. Similarly, C 3 2n,n is hard-coded in Steps e10-e11 and d10-d11 where E3 and D3 are (initially everywhere ⊥) arrays to store the output of the ideal cipher.
In the following, we use the lazily-sample ideal cipher in Fig. 5 . E and D are (initially everywhere ⊥) arrays and T E and T D (initially empty) tables. For any (k,
. On a query which the key element is k, first the output of E I (k, c 1 ) is determined (steps 03-04 or steps [13] [14] and second the output of E I (k, c 2 ) is determined (Steps 05-06 or Steps 15-16). Then the outputs of E I (k, x) such that x = c 1 and x = c 2 are determined. Since no adversary (distinguisher) learns E I (k, c 1 ) and E I (k, c 2 ) until querying the corresponding value, the procedures of the steps 03-06 and 13-16 do not affect the lazily-sample ideal cipher simulation.
We compare the simulator with the lazily-sample ideal cipher. In the simulator and the ideal cipher, 
. So the statistical distance of the simulator and the ideal cipher is at most (2lq
, S E , S D ) and this is the F 2 scenario.
We show that unless the following bad events occur, the A 4 's view of Game 1 and Game 2 is the same.
-Event B1: On some query (k, x) to S E , the output y is such that y ⊕ x is equal to c 1 or c 2 .
-Event B2: On some query (k, x) to S E , the output y is such that y ⊕ x ⊕ C is equal to c 1 or c 2 .
-Event B3: On some query (k, y) to S D , the output x is equal to c 1 or c 2 such that x is defined in the step D08.
To prove this, we use the proof method in [5, 15] . Specifically, we prove the following two points. In the following, for input-output triple (k, x, y) of S we denote x ⊕ y by w, namely, w = x ⊕ y. Before proving the above two points, we define chain triples and give a useful lemma. (k 1 , x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (k i , x i , y i ), (k 1 , x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (k i , x i , y i ), (k, x, y), (k , x , y ) [1] , and y||y = F S (M ).
Definition 3.
x 1 = IV [0], k 1 [0] = IV [1], k j = k j (j = 1, . . . , i), w j = x j+1 (j = 1, . . . , i−1), w j ⊕C = x j+1 (j = 1, . . . , i−1), w j = k j+1 [0] (j = 1, . . . , i − 1), x = c 1 , x = c 2 , k = k , k[0] = w i , k[1] = w i , M = k 1 [1]|| · · · ||k i
Lemma 7. For any chain triple
Proof. To contrary, assume that there exist chain triples (
. Then, since the output of S is defined by E2 I or E3 I , one of the following events occur.
-Event 1: In the inner calculation of F S (M ), some triple is defined by E3 I . That is, some of ( Next consider Event 2. First consider the case that (k, x, y) is defined by E2 I . Then the triple is defined in S D because x = c 1 (if the triple is defined in S E , it is defined by E2 I due to the condition of the step E07). So the triple is defined in the step D08. The bad event 3 occurs. Finally, consider the case that (k , x , y ) is defined by E2 I . Then the triple is defined in S D because x = c 2 . So the triple is defined in the step D08. The bad event 3 occurs.
Proof of Point 1. From the above lemma, unless the bad event occurs, the output of
Proof of Point 2. Since in Game 1 for any M the output of O F (M ) is calculated by F S (M ), we must show that in Game 2 the relation also holds, that is, unless the bad events occur, for any chain triples (k 1 , x 1 , y 1 
. From the above lemma, unless the bad event occurs, this holds.
The Bound of | Pr[G2] − Pr[G1]|. The above two points imply that unless the bad events occur, the A 4 's view of Game 1 and Game 2 is the same, and so we have that
where Bi j is the event Bi in Game j. Since the number of queries to S in Game 1 is more than that in Game 2,
First, we evaluate the probability Pr[B1 1 ]. In Game 1, the number of queries to S is at most 2(lq F + 1) + q E + q D . So the output is randomly chosen from at least 2 n − (2(lq F + 1) + q E + q D ) values. We thus have that
Second, we evaluate the probability Pr[B2 1 ]. From the same discussion as Pr[B1 1 ],
Finally, we evaluate the probability Pr[B3 1 ]. A value in the step D08 is defined by D2 I . That is, in this case, the output of D2 I is equal to c 1 or c 2 . Since the number of queries to C 2 2n,n is at most 2(lq F +1)+q E +q D , So the output of D2 I is randomly chosen from at least 2 n − (2(lq F + 1) + q E + q D ) values. We thus have that
.
We thus have that
Consequently, we can obtain the following bound.
Using Theorem 2 and Lemma 6, we show that F is PRO up to O(2 n ) query complexity in the IC model. 
Theorem 3 (F is PRO). There exists a simulator S = (S E
where S 2 works in time O(q + 2lqQ) + 2lq × Time(unpad) and makes 2q queries to F 2n where Q = 2l(q H + 1)
Proof. We use Theorem 2 and Lemma 6. We define a simulator by S = S S2 where S is defined in Lemma 6 and S 2 is defined in Theorem 2. Specifically, S E = S . We assume that A 4 is a distinguisher such that the indifferentiable bound of F from F 2 is maximum, and A 3 is a distinguisher such that the PRO bound of F 2 is maximum. For any distinguisher A, Thus, when using the bounds of Theorem 2 and Lemma 6, the PRO bound of F can be obtained where A 4 can make at most (q H , q E , q D ) queries to its three oracles (see Lemma 6) and A 3 can make at most (q H , q E , q D , 2(q E + q D ), 0) queries to its five oracles (see Theorem 2).
The value k used in line 05 is the first input of the post-processing function of O F (M ). Note that we don't write the procedure to know k. So there are the two cases: (case 1) A makes queries to O E or O D to know k and (case 2) A does not make the queries. In the case 2 the above attack explicitly does not work. So consider the case 1. One may think that since i is a random value, no simulator can know the line wherein w is defined, and by using this fact, A can distinguish (F C2n,n , E I , D I ) from (F 2n , S E , S D ). However, since the compression functions used in the inner calculation is PrA, in the case 1 the simulator can know M from k, and thus, the simulator can know the value i. That is the simulator can know the line. So the attack does not work.
B Abreast-DM Is PrA
Abreast-DM [16] incorporates two Davies-Meyer (DM) single block length compression functions which are used side-by-side. The compression function is formally given in Definition 4.
where H denotes the bit-by-bit complement of H. We call the first procedure "first block" and the second procedure "second block".
We show that the Abreast-DM compression function is PrA with O(2 n ) security. where E runs in time at most O(q e q P ).
Theorem 4 (Abreast-DM is PrA
Proof. We will prove that any such compression function is 1-WPrA, and then Lemma 1 gives the final bound. We note that Theorem 1 of [11] upperbounds the cr-advantage by 18(q P /2 n−1 ) 2 , yielding the first term above. Note that the cr-advantage is also bounded by the result of [17] . Let us define the multi-point extractor E + as follows. If an input-output triple of the first block is defined, automatically the input of the second block is defined, and vice versa, from the definition of the compression function. For a query (z, α) to E + , when there is an input-output triple (k, x, y) such that x ⊕ y = z[0], the multi-point extractor E + checks whether the output of the second block is equal to z [1] or not and if this holds the multi-point extractor stores it in the return list L, and vice versa. Therefore, A must find a preimage (k, x) of z to win the 1-WPrA experiment. Thus one can straightforwardly adapt the preimage resistant advantage of the compression function (Theorem 2 in [11] ). The advantage is at most 2q P /(2 n − q P ) 2 .
C Tandem-DM Is PrA
Tandem-DM [16] incorporates two Davies-Meyer (DM) single block length compression functions which are used side-by-side. The compression function is formally given in Definition 5. 
We call the procedures of 3 and 4 "first block" and the procedures of 5 "second block".
We show that the Tandem-DM compression function is PrA with O(2 n ) security. where E runs in time at most O(q e q P ) and p is the cr-advantage of Tandem-DM described in Theorem 1 of [19] .
Proof. We will prove that any such compression function is 1-WPrA, and then Lemma 1 to give the final bound. We note that Theorem 1 of [10] upperbounds the cr-advantage by p, yielding the terms excluding the last term. Let us define the multi-point extractor E + as follows: If an input-output triple of the first block is defined, automatically the input triple of the second block is defined, and vice versa, from the definition of the compression function. For a query (z, α) to E + , when there is an input-output triple (k, x, y) such that x ⊕ y = z[0], the multi-point extractor E + checks whether the output of the second block is equal to z [1] or not and if this holds the multi-point extractor stores it in the return list L, and vice versa. Therefore, A must find a preimage (k, x) of z to win the 1-WPrA experiment. Then one can straightforwardly adapt the preimage resistant advantage of Tandem-DM (Theorem 2 in [10] ). This advantage is at most 2q P /(2 n − q P ) 2 .
